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Abstract 
This paper discusses the difficulty of having three different objectives for the electricity supply sectors 
in the EU: renewable energy goals, emission reduction goals and minimising consumer prices. In the 
environment associated with the power markets, the regulatory mechanisms interact with each other 
and thus the attainment of the specified goals.  
Analytical discussions in the paper show that synergies do exist between the different regulation 
mechanisms and the targets. However, the challenge of having the different targets lies in the fact that 
the mechanisms at present cover different geographical areas and sectors, and that the targets are set 
differently within each Member State. 
This is an analytical paper, and its aim is to shed some light on the complexity of this regulation 
area and inspire more researchers to work in it. 
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Introduction∗ 
The regulators face different challenging questions when working with the regulation of the power 
sector in the European Union (EU). Some of these questions are: Can different energy goals co-exist 
in the power markets? How can the different goals be simultaneously regulated? Are there synergic 
effects between the regulation mechanisms that help the regulator to achieve the goals?  
Different political goals have been set within the power sector in the EU in the last twenty years. 
During this period, the supply side of the power markets in the EU has been liberalised. One of the 
main goals of this liberalisation was to create an efficient power supply with low prices for the 
consumers (EU Directives 96/92/EC and 2003/54/EC).  
Concurrently, there is a growing focus on the use of electricity from renewable energy sources 
(RES-E) within the EU. Indicative targets have been decided for the Member States (EU Directive 
2001/77/EC) adding up to a target of 22% of the EU-15 electricity consumption by 2010 compared 
with a RES-E share of 13.9% in 1997. 
Recently, the EU ratified the Kyoto-protocol on greenhouse gas reduction targets with an overall 
reduction of 8% during the period 2008-2012 relative to 1990 (EU Directives 2003/87/EC and EU 
2002/358/EC).  
Therefore, there are (at least) three main political targets that have to be taken into consideration 
when analysing the power markets in the EU. These main targets are: 
1. Low consumer prices; 
2. RES-E targets with increased use of RES-E; 
3. Greenhouse gas reduction targets with respect to emissions from the power sector. 
Some sort of regulation is required in order to achieve these targets. Looking separately at each 
target, it could be argued simply that three different regulation mechanisms are needed in order to 
achieve the three different targets. However, the targets have to be achieved simultaneously, and since 
the different targets and regulation mechanisms interact, it is not straightforward simply to choose and 
apply regulation mechanisms. This is the cornerstone of this paper.  
From a welfare economic view point, without looking at the positive externalities of renewable 
energy1 and emission reductions, the most advantageous allocation of ressources is determined in a 
competitive electricity market without environmental regulation. Compared to this the introduction of 
environmental regulation and targets lead to reductions in social welfare. However, taking account of 
externalities it might be argued that it is reasonable to introduce environmental regulation and targets 
(Hohmeyer, 1988, Söderholm and Sundqvist, 2003).  
This paper does not go further into the discussion of externalities and whether it is a good idea to 
have environmental regulation and targets. Instead it is assumed that the three targets of low consumer 
prices, increased quotas of RES-E, and reduction of emissions have been set. 
Instruments of regulation such as taxes, tariffs or quotas guarantee that the defined objective will be 
achieved at the lowest cost (Baumol et al., 1971). Recent analyses of the EU support schemes for 
                                                     
∗ This paper was presented at the Florence School of Regulation Workshop ‘Energy and the Environment: the Market 
Approach’, conducted on 12-13 November 2004 in Florence, Italy. 
1  Renewable energy decreases dependency on limited fuel resources, decreases emissions, and increases local production 
and the security and diversification of the energy supply.  
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RES-E have shown that price-based and quantity-based approaches are seen as comparable methods 
for achieving RES-E targets (Menanteauet et al. 2003, Finon and Menanteau 2003, Ringel 2006).  
The challenge, therefore, is not to choose between different regulation instruments designed to 
achieve the same target, but rather to choose between instruments in order to fulfill different targets. 
Most studies of these targets are made seperately for each target (e.g., Soleille 2005, Boemare et al 
2003). Only a few studies have so far analysed the acheivement of the three targets simultanously 
(e.g., Jensen and Skytte 2003, Boots 2003).  
The question remains of how to regulate in order to achieve the three targets simultanously when 
the different regulation instruments interact. The objective of this paper is to discuss these interactions 
and to emphasise any positive synergy effects2 there may be between the mechanisms which can help 
towards the achievement of the targets. This can be used to give an indication of which mechanisms 
should be used and at what level. 
This paper discusses analytically the interactions between different regulation mechanisms and 
discusses how the three main targets can be achieved. The paper begins with a short description of the 
main regulation mechanisms that are designed to promote RES-E or to reduce emissions from the 
power sector. It then looks at the interactions between the mechanisms and the targets in closed 
national markets. Potential synergy effects are emphasised in a discussion on how the mechanisms can 
be used in order to achieve the different targets. Similar discussions of bi-national and international 
markets follow on. The paper closes with some final remarks. 
Main Regulation Mechanisms 
EU recognises the need to promote RES-E as a priority measure given that “their exploitation 
contributes to environmental protection and sustainable development. In addition this can also create 
local employment, have a positive impact on social cohesion, contribute to security and diversification 
of energy supply and make it possible to meet emission targets more quickly” (EU Directive 
2001/77/EC). 
At present, most supplies of RES-E are more costly to generate than conventional power based on 
fossil fuels. Therefore, in order to achieve the energy targets of using more RES-E, it is necessary to 
subsidise this production. There is a wide array of different support mechanisms in order to promote 
RES-E. The three main mechanisms within the Member States are feed-in tariffs, green certificates 
and tendering systems. All three mechanisms give priority to RES-E compared to conventionally 
produced electricity.  
The feed-in tariff is a subsidy on output in the form of a guaranteed fixed price in combination with 
a purchase obligation imposed on the utilities. Within a green certificate system, the green certificates 
are given to RES-E producers according to the amount of RES-E that they feed into the system. The 
RES-E producers can sell these certificates, which yields revenue in addition to selling their physical 
power. The demand for green certificates is guaranteed by imposing a purchase obligation, either on 
consumers or on the suppliers of electricity3. This purchase obligation is often set as a green quota, for 
example where the consumers have to purchase an amount of green certificates that correspond to 
10% of their electricity consumption if the green quota for the consumers is 10%.  
In tendering or bidding systems, tenders are invited by a public body to compete either for a certain 
financial budget or a certain capacity of RES-E generation. These systems often guarantee the winners 
of the bids sales of a certain amount of RES-E to the prices bid. In other words, they work more or less 
like the feed-in system, where the tariff is determined in the tendering auction. 
                                                     
2  In this paper, we refer to a positive effect if it helps towards achievement of the targets. 
3  For the remainder of this paper, we refer to green certificate systems with the purchase obligation at the consumer side. 
Interplay between Environmental Regulation and Power Markets 
EUI-WP RSCAS No. 2006/04 © 2006 Klaus Skytte 3 
In both the feed-in and the tendering systems, the subsidy cost is the difference between the 
guaranteed price and the market price for electricity. This cost is often reimbursed by a non-
discriminatory levy paid by all electricity consumers. In that way, the cost of the subsidies is shared as 
in the green certificate system. However, the systems differ in the way that the amount (the green 
quota) within the green certificate system is fixed and the price and total cost are determined in the 
market. In the feed-in system, the price is fixed and the amount and total costs are determined in the market.  
Regulation is also needed in order to implement the emission reduction targets. The most widely 
used regulation mechanisms within the EU are emission taxes, fuel taxes and tradable emission 
allowances. These mechanisms have in common that an extra cost is charged to the conventional 
power producers. Therefore, the costs of conventionally based power supplies are increased by the use 
of these regulation mechanisms. RES-E producers are often exempted from emission and fuel taxes.  
Emission allowances are the main mechanism in the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) that help towards a pan-European emission market (EU Directive 
2003/87/EC). An emission allowance is an allowance to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
equivalent greenhouse gas4 during a specified period. The emission allowances are allocated within 
each Member States according to national allocation plans. The emission allowances are tradable and 
can be transferred between persons within the EU and between the EU and third countries if there is a 
mutual reorganisation.  
If a producer wishes to produce more than the allocated emission allowances permit, he can 
purchase more emission allowances from other producers that do not use them. The supply and 
demand of emission allowances will determine their market price and work as an emission tax on the 
production that exceeds the individual amount of allowances. The production that does not exceed the 
individual amount of allowances is in principle exempted from the extra cost of buying allowances. 
The price for emission allowances drops to zero if the actual total emission level is lower than the 
total emission target, i.e. if the target is fulfilled without the use of emission regulation.  
Part of the reduction in emission can also be obtained by applying Kyoto-mechanisms (EU 
Directive 2004/101/EC), e.g., joint implementation (JI) and clean development mechanisms (CDM). 
National Markets 
Each regulation mechanism was originally designed to achieve a specific goal, e.g., lower consumer 
prices, a certain amount of RES-E, or emission reduction. However, a mechanism might also help to 
achieve one of the other goals simultaneously with achieving the goal it is designed for. These 
synergies will be examined below—first within closed national markets (autarchy) and then within 
international markets. 
Synergies with RES-E Regulation 
Feed-in tariffs, green certificate systems, and RES-E tenders are regulation mechanisms that are 
designed to achieve RES-E targets. However, a larger share of RES-E will displace an equivalent 
amount of conventionally based power and thereby lower the amount of emissions from the power 
sector. There is therefore positive synergy between the use of RES-E regulation and the target of 
emission reduction. 
There might also be synergy with the goal of lowering the consumer prices. The RES-E 
displacement of a similar amount of conventional power exerts pressure on the conventional power, 
                                                     
4  The greenhouse gases referred to are Carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous Oxide (N2O), Hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), Perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and Sulphur Hexafluoride (SF6). 
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i.e. demand and wholesale prices for conventional power decrease. This might result in a lowering of 
the consumer price aswell.  
In order to examine this effect on the consumer prices it is first necessary to examine the effect on 
the wholesale power prices of promoting RES-E. In order to do so, we start by looking at a reference 
case with a closed power market without regulation. In this case, we assume that all RES-E and 
conventional technologies compete in the same power market with marginal price setting. In order to 
keep the illustrations simple, it is assumed that the RES-E is more costly than the conventionally based 
power. This is illustrated by the dashed part of the power supply curve (S) in Figure 1. The demand for 
power is illustrated by the demand curve (D) in the figure. 
Figure 1: Market without regulation (reference case). The hatched area indicates the consumer 
and producer surpluses. 
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The intersection of the demand and supply curves determines the equilibrium demand (Q1) and 
price (p1) for electricity5. The producers that can supply at a cost lower than or equal to p1 will do so. 
They all receive the same price (p1) for each unit of electricity they supply. Since the RES-E part of 
the supply curve lies to the right of the equilibrium quantity, no RES-E is supplied in the reference case.  
In this case, where there are no subsidy costs, the net consumer price equals the price (p1) for 
electricity in the conventional wholesale market. The net consumer cost (without transmission losses 
and costs, taxes, etc.) can be determined as the total demand times the consumer price, i.e., as Q1 x p1. 
The consumer surplus is the hatched area between the retangle Q1 x p1 and the demand curve D in 
Figure 1. The hatched area below this and above the supply curve is the producer surplus. 
In order to achieve a RES-E target, it is necessary to regulate. As mentioned in the introduction of 
this paper, the three main mechanisms, feed-in tariffs, green certificates and tendering systems, all 
give priority to RES-E compared to conventionally produced electricity. In order to see this, a graphic 
illustration is shown in Figures 2a and 2b. 
 
                                                     
5  The equilibrium price (p1) equals the marginal cost of the marginal power supplier. 
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Figure 2a: Markets with regulation using feed-in tariffs 
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Imposing a feed-in tariff (T) implies that the part of the RES-E supply which has lower costs than 
the tariff will be given priority compared to conventionally produced electricity. In other words, a 
certain share (KT) of the consumption (Q2) will be RES-E. This share is determined by the size of the 
tariff and by the supply curve for RES-E (SRES-E). 
This amount of RES-E (KTQ2) will displace a corresponding amount of conventional power, and 
thereby lower the demand for conventional power (Dconv), which decreases the market price for 
electricity. This is illustrated in Figure 2a with a decrease from p1 before the tariff is introduced to p2 
after the tariff is introduced. It is assumed that the subsidy cost of the feed-in system is reimbursed by 
a non-discriminatory levy paid by all electricity consumers according to their power consumption, i.e. 
the consumer price is given as the power price plus the share of RES-E multiplied by the tariff. The 
consumer price is equal to p1 before the feed-in system is introduced. The consumer price is equal to 
p2 + KTT after the feed-in system is introduced.  
For the consumers there is a cost saving from lowering the power price, and an additional cost 
(KTT) following the use of RES-E instead of conventionally produced power. The decrease in the 
power price from p1 to p2 may be either higher or lower than the additional cost (KTT). As a result, the 
consumer price may either increase or decrease when the feed-in system is introduced. Figure 2a 
illustrates a case with a decrease in the consumer price (the dashed line between p1 and p2) and an 
increase in the equilibrium demand from Q1 to Q2. 
Similar observations can be made for a quota-based system, for example, a green certificate system 
with purchase obligation imposed on consumers. This is illustrated in Figure 2b. The authorities 
introduce the green quota (Kc) as a percentage of consumption. This corresponds to the demand for 
green certificates, and thereby also to the demand for RES-E. As in the case of feed-in tariffs, this 
amount (KcQ2) will displace a corresponding amount of conventional power, thereby lowering the 
demand for conventional power and decreasing the market price for electricity. This is illustrated in 
Figure 2b with a decrease from p1 before the quota is introduced to p2 after the quota is introduced6. 
                                                     
6  Similar observations can be made for a tender procedure based on guaranteed prices. 
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Figure 2b: Markets with regulation using green certificates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The RES-E suppliers offer their power at low prices in order to be sure to sell their power at the 
market price (p2). The price for certificates (pc) is determined by the market as the difference between 
the market price for electricity (p2) and the marginal cost of RES-E.  
Somehow the possible decrease in the consumer price seems contra intuitive when displacing 
conventional power generation with more costly RES-E. Comparing Figures 1 and 2a/b indicates that 
the producer surplus changes when the RES-E regulation is introduced. These changes are illustrated 
in Figure 3. The conventional producer surplus decreases with the left hatched area in Figures 3. The 
RES-E producers receive a producer surplus equal to the right hatched area in Figure 3. The costs to 
the RES-E suppliers are thereby covered, and only the conventional power suppliers will de facto 
experience a decrease in revenue. 
Figure 3: Changes in producer surplus from regulation. 
Similar observations can be made for the change in the consumer surplus. There may either be an 
increase or a decrease in the consumer surplus. In the illustrated case there is a redistribution of the 
producer surplus from the conventionally based production to the RES-E production and to the consumers. 
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In other words, the conventional power producers pay part of the costs of introducing more RES-E 
by lowering their profit—even though the remaining regulation costs are reimbursed by the electricity 
consumers. Consequently, RES-E regulation does not counteract the target of low consumer prices—
even though consumer prices do not always decrease, the consumer costs might be lower than if 
another mechanism had been applied. In other words, positive synergy exists between the RES-E 
target and the goal of low consumer prices. 
When introducing a green quota, the quota (Kc) is set as a percentage of consumption. Therefore, 
the consumer price changes from p1 to p2 + Kc pc. An ambiguous result with respect to consumer 
surplus implies a correspondingly ambiguous result with respect to the consumer price (p1 versus p2 + 
Kcpc). In other words, the effect on the consumer price following an introduction of a feed-in tariff or 
of green certificates is ambiguous; there is a possibility of lowering as well as increasing the consumer 
price—even though the RES-E is more costly than the conventionally produced power.  
The ambiguous effect on the consumer price is illustrated with arbitrary numbers in the text box. 
For more detailed and mathematical discussions, see (Skytte, 2001 or Jensen and Skytte, 2002).  
Example of decreasing consumer prices (arbitrary numbers). 
The sizes of changes in producer and consumer surpluses and in volumes depend on the slope and 
level of the two supply curves (S and SRES-E) as well as the size of the quota (Kc)7. It is ambiguous as to 
whether the consumer surplus will increase or decrease as a result of introducing or increasing a feed-
in tariff or a green quota. Skytte (Skytte 2001) shows that the effect changes when the quota increases. 
With given supply and demand functions, a quota at a low level might result in a decrease in the 
consumer price, whereas a high level might lead to an increase in the consumer price. 
Bye (Bye 2003 and Bye et al 2002) makes a quantitative analysis with a model of the Norwegian 
power market. He shows that the effects on the consumer price and volume are ambiguous under a 
wide range of alternative levels of the quota. However, when the quota increases above a certain level, 
the consumer price increases again and the volume effect is negative. Although the effects are 
sensitive to elasticities of demand and supply of both conventional and RES-E technologies, the main 
results are robust against a variety of combinations of elasticities. 
Similar quantitative model simulations can be found in Hindsberger (Hindsberger et al. 2003) for 
the Baltic markets.  
Synergies with Emission Regulation 
Emission taxes, fuel taxes and emission allowance systems are regulation mechanisms that are 
designed to achieve emission reduction targets. These mechanisms imply an introduction of additional 
                                                     
7  Or the size of the tariff in a system with feed-in tariffs. 
Numerical example with a green certificate system: 
• Assume that the RES-E quota Kc = 10%, the marginal RES-E cost is 30 €/MWh, and that 
the power price changes from p1 = 22 €/MWh to p2 = 18 €/MWh. 
• Then, the certificate price pc = 30—18 = 12 €/MWh.  
• This implies a consumer price of p2 + Kc pc = 19.2 €/MWh. 
• In other words, the consumer price decreases from 22 to 19.2 €/MWh when the RES-E 
quota, Kc, is introduced compared to the reference case without RES-E regulation. 
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costs to the conventional producers, for example, from purchasing emission allowances. This causes 
the cost of conventionally based power supplies to increase, which makes RES-E more competitive. In 
other words, there is positive synergy between the use of emission regulation and the RES-E target. 
Starting from the reference case in Figure 1, in a market without regulation, the effect of emission 
regulation is illustrated in Figure 4. The conventional producers face an additional cost, which shifts 
the conventional supply curve upwards according to the additional costs from S1 to S2. Consequently, 
the costs to the highest-costing suppliers and those with the highest emissions will be very high, so 
that the RES-E producers are better off. This is illustrated in Figure 4, where after the introduction of 
the emission regulation some of the RES-E are to the left-hand of the demand curve, as well as some 
of the conventional power being to the right-hand of the demand curve.  
The amount of ousted conventionally based power relates to the corresponding decrease in 
emissions cf. the emission quota. 
Figure 4: A market with emission regulation 
In this case, the price faced by the consumer equals the power price. Therefore, the consumer price 
increases from p1 top2, which is an unambiguous increase since the cost to the marginal power 
supplier is higher than that without regulation. In other words, there is no direct positive synergy 
between the use of emission regulation and the goal of lowering the consumer prices. 
Two Targets and Two Mechanisms—National Markets 
The foregoing sections in this paper have shown that synergies do exist. RES-E regulation has a 
positive effect on emission reduction and it may lead to lower consumer prices. Emission regulation is 
beneficial for the RES-E target, but it results in higher consumer prices. 
From the discussion on synergies between the mechanisms, it is possible to formulate some general 
guidelines for applying the mechanisms in closed national markets.  
If a country only has a RES-E target besides the goal of lower consumer prices,  
• the RES-E regulation mechanisms should be applied.  
If the country only has an emission target besides the goal of lower consumer prices,  
• the RES-E regulation mechanisms can be applied when there is positive synergy between 
the consumer price and the RES-E regulation, thus achieving both the emission target and 
lower consumer prices; 
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• the emission regulation mechanisms can be applied when there is no positive synergy, and 
only the emission target will be achieved. 
The choice of regulation mechanisms also depends on the costs of using the mechanisms. Even 
though the use of RES-E regulation in some cases increases the consumer price, emission regulation 
may further increase the consumer price. In addition, it is necessary to analyse which conventional 
technologies are displaced by the RES-E regulation. The use of RES-E regulation to achieve an 
emission target is difficult if the displaced conventional technology has a very low emission compared 
with the remaining technologies. In other words, it is easier to use RES-E regulation in order to 
achieve an emission target if the marginal conventional power plants are high emitters8. 
If the country has both RES-E and emission targets,  
• both types of regulation mechanisms can be applied, for example, setting the quotas equal 
to the targets, when there is no positive synergy effect between RES-E regulation and the 
consumer price; 
• RES-E regulation9 can be applied when there is positive synergy between RES-E 
regulation and the consumer price. 
It is important to note that as long as the emission target is binding, an increase in the RES-E target 
wil not affect the actual emission level. However, the presure on the emission target will decrease. In a 
system like the EU emission trading scheme this means that an increase in the RES-E deployment 
lowers the price for emission allowances but the actual level of emissions stays at the emission target 
level as long as there is a positive price for allowances. This is beneficial for the conventional 
producers that buy emission allowances in order to produce electricity.  
In other words, in a system with market-based pricing for emission reduction the synergy effect of 
an increased deployment of RES-E will more or less vanish; part of the decrease in the producer 
surplus for the conventional producers is counteracted by a decrease in the cost of buying emission 
allowances. 
One way to avoid this is by regonising the CO2-benefit of deploying RES-E and reducing the 
emission reduction target accordingly when increasing the RES-E target (Boots 2003). However, due 
to uncertainty of how much CO2 reduction an additional amount of RES-E will create it is not an easy 
task to make a precise adjustment to the emission reduction target. 
International Markets  
So far, we have looked for synergies within closed national markets with national regulation. When a 
common power market is created with cross-border trading within the EU and with regulation systems 
that cover several Member States, it is essential to inverstigate whether these synergies also exist in 
these cases. 
In addition, it is interesting to see whether international markets result in different power prices for 
the consumers due to different RES-targets, and whether levels of realised national CO2-reduction 
differ compared to the efforts exerted.  
The discussions are split in two main cases: 
1. Common international markets where both the electricity, RES-E and emission regulations 
cover the same geographic area and sectors. 
                                                     
8  For further discussion of the use of mechanisms, see Jensen and Skytte, 2003. 
9  The RES-E quota must in some cases be set higher than the RES-E target in order to achieve the emission target. 
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2. Different markets where the electricity, RES-E and emission regulations do not cover the 
same geographic area or sectors. 
Common Markets 
In this case it is assumed that the electricity, RES-E and emission regulations cover the same 
geographic area and sectors. As an example, this could be a pan-European electricity market, a similar 
pan-European green certificate market, and a similar pan-European emission allowance market.  
When all markets are international and cover the same geographic area and sectors, we observe the 
same effects as with national markets when using common forms of regulation. A common increase of 
RES-E will lower the total amount of emissions and it will lower the common power price. Similarly, 
a common regulation of the emission reduction is beneficial to the RES-E producers. 
Therefore, from an overall perspective, the positive synergies observed in national closed markets 
can also be observed in the common markets. However, if a single Member State makes a national 
change in its regulation target, for example a national increase in a RES-E quota, it has little effect on 
the common international prices, if the corresponding national sector is small compared to the total 
market. In other words, for a small Member State, the synergies between the regulation mechanisms 
diminish if the other Member States do not change their regulations mechanisms simultaneously.  
This can be illustrated by looking at a small Member State that is member of a large common 
power market, a similar common RES-E regulation market (e.g., a green certificate system) and a 
similar common emission regulation market (e.g., an emission allowances system). If the small 
Member State increases its national RES-E quota (or sets a higher quota than the other Member 
States), and if the other Member States keep their quotas constant, then the additional implementation 
of RES-E caused by the increase can take place in all the countries within the RES-E regulation 
market (Skytte, 1999). The implication is that the CO2-benefits of the increase have to be shared with 
the other Member States. Since the Member State is small compared with the total market, the 
common power price will only be slightly affected by the increase in the national quota. With an 
insignificant counteraction in the prices when increasing the regulation costs, the power consumers of 
the small Member State pay most of the cost of the increase.  
The example also illustrates that within common markets, countries with low RES-E targets benefit 
with respect to emission reduction, deployment of RES-E technologies and consumer prices, 
compared to countries with high RES-E targets. An example of this is the different national indicative 
RES-E targets that are set for each of the EU-15 Member States (EU Directive 2001/77/EC and Voogt 
et al. 2001). 
Different Markets 
It is the intention of the EU Directives (EU Directives 96/92/EC and 2003/87/EC) to make common 
pan-European electricity and emission allowance markets. At present there is no similar declaration 
about creating a common pan-European RES-E market. In addition, there are often bottlenecks in the 
electricity network that split the power market into smaller markets with different electricity prices. At 
present and in the near future, it is therefore most likely that the electricity, RES-E and emission 
regulations will not cover the same geographic area or sectors. 
When only some markets are international, or when they do not cover the same geographical area 
or sectors, we do not observe the same effects as with national markets when applying common 
regulation. As an example, one can consider a small country that acts in international and national 
markets simultaneously, for example, an international common power market and a national green 
certificate market. In this case, the international power price is (more or less) independent of changes 
in the national quota.  
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Increasing the green quota in the national green certificate market (with an international power 
market) hardly affects the conventional production or the level of emission in that country. This is 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
Figure 5: Supply and demand in a small country with an international power market and with 
national regulation using green certificates. 
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Introducing the RES-E quota, Kc, as a percentage of the national power demand, implies a 
prioritisation of KcQ2 of the national RES-E supply. This lowers the marginal national supply costs of 
conventional power. However, the power price is determined in an international market, and 
consequently not affected by the national increase in RES-E. As a result, a larger share of power will 
be exported from the small country. This is illustrated in Figure 5 where E1 is the assumed initial 
export from the country to the other countries within the common power market. When the national 
RES-E quota, Kc, is introduced, the amount exported increases from E1 to E2. 
Since the conventional power production is hardly affected by the national increase of the RES-E 
quota, the emission level from the conventional power sector in the country is unaffected. The 
consumers of the country pay the entire additional cost of the national RES-E regulation since the 
power price does not interact with the increased use of expensive RES-E, and the positive synergies 
are attenuated. RES-E regulation hardly affects the emissions from the national power sector and the 
consumer price increases. RES-E can therefore only be used to achieve RES-E targets.  
Similar observations can be made, with an increase in the national emission reduction. Since the 
power price is determined at the international market, the RES-E supplies will not become in a better 
competitive position when the small country increases its emission reduction regulation. 
As indicated, the positive synergies disappear when the markets do not cover the same 
geographical area or the same industrial sectors. This is also the case with trade between the EU and 
other countries. The Greenhouse Gas Directive (EU Directive 2003/87/EC) opens up for mutual trade 
with emission allowances between the EU and other countries. In addition, the EU Linking Directive 
(EU Directive 2004/101/EC) makes it possible to use a certain share of Kyoto mechanisms in order to 
fulfil the national emission quotas.  
In a closed system, an increase in the RES-E share decreases the market price for emission 
allowances. By trading emission allowances with third countries, using Kyoto mechanisms, or by 
international emission trade, the price for CO2 will be determined in an international market (Jepma, 
2003). Therefore, the price for emission allowances will hardly be affected by an increase in the RES-
E share within a Member State of EU. This is illustrated in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: International CO2 markets 
EU
Emission Allowances
Emissions Trading
Joint Implementation
CDM
One price of CO2
TGC Market
Specific promotion of 
RES
 
 
International mutual trading with CO2 implies that promotion of RES-E in the EU might cause a 
release of emission allowances that can be sold to countries outside EU. This raises a dilemma, since 
the promotion of RES-E will be beneficial to the emission trade at the expense of the power 
consumers. Similarly, CDM/JI projects may reduce the price of emission allowances which might 
reduce the incentive to deploy RES-E within the EU (Rio González 2005). 
Constraints in one of the markets may also work against the targets. Amundsen and Mortensen 
(2001) have studied the relationship between a green certificate market and a market for CO2 
allowances, under the constraint of upper and lower price limits on the green certificates. They 
particularly show that under certain circumstances harsher CO2 constraints may lead to less 
deployment of RES-E. 
Two Targets and Two Mechanisms—International Markets 
The discussions of the international markets have shown that formulating general guidelines for the 
application of the different regulating mechanisms is not a straightforward process. Targets and 
regulations at the EU level must be distinguished from targets and regulations at national levels. 
Looking at targets and regulations at the EU level, the recommendations for applying the different 
regulation mechanisms follow the recommendations that are given in this paper for closed national markets.  
Looking at targets and regulations at national levels, it is necessary to consider how costs are 
divided between achieving RES-E targets and emission reduction targets. Even within common 
markets, different national targets can lead to differences in consumer costs.  
Even if a certain geographic spread of RES-E deployment and emission reduction is efficient at the 
EU level, it might not be obtainable if the national targets differ or if the markets do not cover the 
same area or sectors. Countries with high RES-E or ambitious emission reduction targets might not be 
interested in using international markets when there is no synergy between the national RES-E and 
emission reduction targets. For a large company that owns both conventional production and 
distribution firms or firms that consume a lot of energy, it may be more profitable to deploy RES-E 
itself than to purchase both emission allowances and green certificates from other actors. This is the 
case if the supply cost of the company’s RES-E is less than the CO2 benefit plus the power and 
certificate prices of this production.  
In the case of different targets and regulations at national levels a detailed analysis of the market 
structure is needed. Otherwise it is not possible to formulate general guidelines for applying the 
different regulation mechanisms. 
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Final Remarks 
The focus of this paper is on the difficulty of setting goals for RES-E deployment and emission 
reduction while at the same time minimising consumer prices in an environment where the regulatory 
mechanisms affect each other and thus the attainment of the specified goals.  
The analytical discussions in this paper show that positive synergies do exist between the different 
regulation mechanisms and the targets of lower consumer prices, a certain amount of RES-E, and 
emission reduction. Even though each regulation mechanism is originally designed to achieve a 
specific target, it might also help towards achieving one of the other targets simultaneously.  
These synergic effects are mostly seen in a closed market. The effects are attenuated when the 
markets do not all cover the same geographical area or sectors. Similar observations can be made with 
other mechanisms. The more targets, mechanisms, sectors and areas there are, the more complex it is 
to regulate and to obtain synergies between the different mechanisms and targets. 
The complexity can be illustrated by comparing four of the main mechanisms within the EU. 
Tradable emission allowances (TEA), tradable green certificates (TGC), Kyoto mechanisms, and 
tradable white certificates (TWC) are all mechanisms that are considered to be in line with the 
liberalisation of the power markets within the EU. However, as illustrated in Table 1, the targets they 
are designed for differ, as well as the sectors and areas they cover.  
Table 1: Different Mechanisms and Markets 
Nat. / bi-nat.ElectricityTGCRES-E
EUElectricity
Supply 
competition
at the power 
markets
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prices
AreaSectorsMechanismGoal
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natural gas, …
TWCEfficiency /Consumption
WorldAllKyotoCO2 and other emissions
EUAllTEACO2 and other emissions
 
 
With the current design of these mechanisms it might be hard to find synergies between them.  
This calls for common markets and targets within the EU. Common markets are enough to ensure 
that the RES-E and emission reduction goals are achieved effectively. When all markets cover the 
same geographical areas and sectors, we observe the same effects as with national markets when using 
common regulation. However, without common targets, consumer prices (burden sharing) will vary 
between the Member States.  
With the different national RES-E targets that are set for each of the EU-15 Member States (EU 
Directive 2001/77/EC) and with the different greenhouse gas reduction targets for each Member State 
(2002/358/EC), common regulation mechanisms will have different effects on the consumer prices in 
each Member State. In other words, the variations in national burden sharing of the regulation costs 
will depend on the national targets.  
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Independently of different targets, the RES-E production and the greenhouse gas reduction will 
take place where it is most economical. When a country has a large RES-E target, the corresponding 
RES-E production might take place in all Member States and the derived greenhouse gas reduction 
benefits have to be shared with the other Member States.  
The consumer cost and price depend on the different targets. The consumer price will be higher in 
Member States with large RES-E targets than in Member States with low RES-E targets. Compared 
with the discussion of Figure 3 the additional cost of having a large RES-E target must be paid by the 
consumers in the country that maintains the large target whereas the corresponding savings in costs 
must be shared with the consumers from the other Member States. However, since the saved costs 
equal the reduction in the conventional producers’ revenue, the conventional producers in all Member 
States pay a part of the costs of using more RES-E. Thereby, the supply competition status of the 
conventional producers in the country with the large RES-E target is not reduced compared with the 
other Member States. 
With respect to different emission reduction targets, an ambitious national emission reduction goal 
might result in a corresponding reduction in different Member States, and the increase in the power 
price and the derived benefits for RES-E have to be shared with the other Member States. The cost of 
achieving the emission reduction targets will be passed on to the emitting sectors in each Member 
State in accordance with the individual reduction targets. Thereby, the competition status of the 
conventional producers in a country with a large emission reduction target is reduced compared with 
the other Member States. However, the costs of reducing the emissions will affect the power price, 
which in a common power market will equally affect the consumer price within all Member States. 
There are thus pros and cons for each of the regulation mechanisms in common markets with different 
national targets. 
A pessimistic reading of the foregoing sections could easily lead to the conclusion that it is almost 
impossible to regulate and achieve the three goals of low consumer prices, a certain amount of RES-E, 
and emission reduction when the markets cover different Member States or sectors. However, positive 
synergic effects still exist at the EU level: A larger share of RES-E will displace an equivalent amount 
of conventionally based power and thereby lower the amount of emissions from the power sector. 
When RES-E is given priority through regulation, it splits the power market into a prioritised part and 
a conventional part. The splitting of the power market makes the power price drop. Thereby, the cost 
of introducing more RES-E is partly paid by the conventional producers that face lower revenues and 
partly by the consumers.  
Consequently, the RES-E regulation has a positive effect on emission reduction and it might lead to 
lower consumer prices at the overall EU level. Emission regulation is beneficial for the RES-E target, 
but it involves higher consumer prices. 
The challenge of having RES-E goals, and emission reduction goals while at the same time 
minimising consumer prices in the EU lies in the fact that the mechanisms at present cover different 
geographical areas and sectors, and that the targets are set differently within each Member State. 
The aim of this paper was not to give a clear-cut solution as to how the regulation mechanisms can 
be used most advantageously. The aim was to open up for a discussion of the use of different 
regulation mechanisms in an environment such as the EU power market where the regulatory 
mechanisms affect each other and thus the attainment of the different goals.  
As the discussions in this paper indicate, there are still many issues within this area to be resolved 
by research. It is my hope that the paper has shed some light on the complexity of this regulation area 
and that the paper will inspire more researchers to work with this area. 
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